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The Impact of Regulatory Complexity upon Self-regulation: 
Evidence from the Adoption and Certification of Environmental Management Systems 
 
Pelin Demirel1, Konstantinos Iatridis2, Effie Kesidou3 
 
This article focuses on environmental management systems (EMS) and aims to enhance our 
understanding of the relationship between environmental state regulation and self-regulation. 
Unlike previous studies that treat state regulation as uni-dimensional and focus on externally 
certified forms of environmental self-regulation, this article takes a more nuanced approach. It 
looks at how direct and indirect state regulation and its stringency influence both non-certified 
in-house and externally certified adoption of EMS. Methodologically, the study differentiates 
from previous research by acknowledging the interconnected nature of in-house and external 
certification decisions, viewing these decisions as sequential. Based on a survey of 2,076 UK 
firms, findings show that effective environmental protection entails collaboration between 
environmental state regulation and in-house adoption of EMS. Results also reveal that 
externally certified EMS substitute for state environmental regulation, filling the void that 
results from weakening state regulation in the context of neoliberalism. 
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1. Introduction 
This article aims to unveil the relationship between environmental state regulation and self-
regulation (both in-house and externally certified forms of self-regulation). This relationship is 
increasingly important for policymakers who are looking to improve environmental 
performance with limited public resources. Yet, the way state regulation interacts with self-
regulation is not clear, impeding policymakers’ ability to enhance corporate environmental 
performance through self-regulatory tools. On one hand, studies in line with Porter hypothesis 
(Porter and van der Linde, 1995), indicate that strict state regulation complements self-
regulation by triggering the adoption of voluntary self-regulatory tools for environmental 
protection (Berrone, et al., 2013; Börzel, 2009; Short and Toffel, 2010; Testa et al., 2011). On 
the other hand, scholars view the rise in the adoption of environmental self-regulatory tools as 
a shift from government to governance where non-state actors, such as corporations, increase 
their participation in regulatory actions (Albareda, 2008; Balleisen and Eisner, 2009; Hysing, 
2009). In this context, state environmental regulation and voluntary self-regulation are 
conceptualized as adversaries or substitutes (Berliner and Prakash, 2013; De La Cuesta 
Gonzalez and Martinez, 2004; Gupta and Innes, 2014; Potoski and Prakash, 2013).  
Despite the significance of this debate, theoretical and empirical insights on whether, 
and how, state regulation affects firms’ decisions to adopt self-regulatory environmental tools 
(e.g. in-house Environmental Management Systems (EMS), ISO14001, Eco-Management 
Audit Scheme (EMAS)) remain non-coherent. Two particular shortcomings in the literature 
lead to this confusion. 
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First, with few exceptions (Potoski and Prakash, 2005; Prakash and Potoski, 2012), 
prior literature treats state environmental regulation as a key, yet one-dimensional, determinant 
of voluntary self-regulation. Hence, little attention is given to understanding which types of 
environmental regulation can stimulate voluntary environmental self-regulatory approaches. 
Nevertheless, in a globalized business environment, characterized by neoliberal deregulation 
attempts (Arsel and Büscher, 2012; Merino et al, 2010; Vogel, 2009), clarifying this 
relationship is crucial to ensure effective corporate environmental performance.   
Second, previous research examining the relationship between state environmental 
regulation and voluntary self-regulation (e.g. González-Benito and González-Benito, 2008; 
Russo, 2009) rarely differentiates between in-house and externally certified forms of self-
regulation. Although the former is not new (Bansal and Bogner, 2002; Jiang and Bansal, 2003), 
and features in previous studies (Aravind and Christmann, 2011; Boiral, 2011; Demirel and 
Kesidou, 2011; Wiengarten et al, 2013), with evidence suggesting that significant proportions 
of firms might opt for in-house self-regulation (Lannelongue and González-Benito, 2012; 
Johnstone and Labonne, 2009), most research focuses solely on externally certified forms of 
environmental self-regulation.  
Both the in-house and externally certified environmental self-regulation entail the 
development of an EMS consisting of management procedures that aim to improve the 
environmental performance of an organization by changing the organizational structure, 
procedures, and routines (Netherwood, 1998). The difference between in-house and externally 
certified forms of self-regulation is that in the former, organizations develop their own EMS 
and do not seek external certification. In turn, externally certified forms of self-regulation entail 
audits from accredited third party auditors to ensure that their EMS is aligned with the 
requirements of the standard (usually ISO 14001 or EMAS).  
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The distinction between in-house adoption and certification of environmental self-
regulation is vital because those firms that choose in-house adoption are primarily seeking to 
reduce their production costs and to improve efficiency (Darnall et al., 2008; King and Lenox, 
2001), whilst firms that opt for certification are oftentimes strategically aiming to enhance their 
legitimacy by signaling improved environmental performance to stakeholders (Castka and 
Prajogo, 2013). Certification is not simply a marketing device, but it has become a prominent 
mode of social and environmental self-regulation (Schneiberg and Bartley, 2008). It is used by 
various stakeholders to tackle information asymmetries and collective action problems (Potoski 
and Prakash, 2009), regulate global supply chains and correct market failures (Guthman, 2007). 
Given the different positioning and objectives of in-house and certified environmental self-
regulation, the literature needs to tackle these separately (Bartley, 2011). 
This article makes a theoretical contribution to the corporate environmental 
responsibility literature by examining the role of different state environmental regulations in 
determining firms’ choice of voluntary environmental self-regulatory tools. In doing so, the 
paper teases out how the diverse dimensions of the regulatory regime, consisting of multiple 
regulatory tools, can generate diverse environmental self-regulation responses among 
corporations. We focus on the three most important dimensions of an environmental regulatory 
regime according to literature (Frondel et al., 2007; Jiménez, 2005; OECD, 2010; Johnstone, 
2007; Khanna et al., 2009) namely, (a) direct instruments (i.e. environmental regulations), (b) 
indirect instruments (i.e. environmental taxes), and (c) the stringency of environmental 
policies, and on EMS (both in-house and certified EMS), i.e. the most widely used self-
regulatory tool for environmental protection (Figure 1).  
-------------------------- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE --------------------------------- 
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Drawing on the theoretical lenses of institutional economics (Bartley, 2011; Potoski 
and Prakash, 2009) and political theory (Abbott and Snidal, 2009; Eberlein et al., 2014), the 
article develops a conceptual framework where corporate voluntarily adoption and certification 
of environmental self-regulatory tools are influenced by public regulation in different ways. 
First, we argue that state regulation complements some forms of self-regulation, such as in-
house EMS. Whilst state environmental regulation corrects failures in markets of responsible 
products and services (Akerlof, 1970), it might not be able to address market failures fully, as 
no single governance actor, either public or private, has all the competencies required to enact 
effective common-interest regulation (Eberlein et al., 2014). The results of this study show that 
effective environmental protection entails collaboration between state regulation and voluntary 
self-regulatory tools (i.e. the in-house EMS). Second, we posit that other forms of 
environmental self-regulation, such as certified EMS, substitute for state regulation. This might 
be due to the diminishing role of the state resulting from the prevalence of neoliberal policies 
(Bartley, 2011). As a consequence, the resulting regulatory void is often filled by some form 
of self-regulation (Potoski and Prakash, 2009).  
Methodologically, the article applies a novel technique in the environmental self-
regulation literature by employing a two-stage nested econometric model, namely a bivariate 
probit with sample selection model, to estimate the determinants of firms’ EMS in-house 
adoption and EMS certification. We follow innovation literature (Piga and Vivarelli, 2004) and 
model EMS in-house adoption and certification decisions in sequential order, using 
simultaneous econometric estimation methods (Berinsky, 2004). Consequently, determinants 
of these two interlinked decisions can be estimated more accurately compared to earlier 
literature that treats these decisions as exogenous in distinct probit models.4 Our modeling 
                                            
4 The assumption of these models is that adopting an EMS and certifying it are two independent decisions with 
no synergies. 
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strategy acknowledges the interconnected nature of the two decisions and views them as 
sequential; minimizing the risks of sample selection bias. Detailed econometric methodology 
is discussed in Section 3. 
Empirically, we contribute to the literature by introducing new firm-level data from the 
UK. We utilize a dataset based on the UK’s official Environmental Protection Expenditure 
survey. In doing so, this study becomes the first large-scale investigation of the in-house 
adoption and certification of self-regulatory tools for environmental responsibility in the UK 
and one of the few large-scale empirical studies related to EMS.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
2.1. Understanding the Relationship between State Environmental Regulation and 
Environmental Self-regulation 
The literature highlights that globalization, the demise of the state, and societal demands for 
environmentally friendly practices are key socio-political developments in promoting 
voluntary environmental self-regulation (Vogel, 2005). These trends have created a complex 
regulatory environment in which the relationship between state environmental regulation and 
self-regulation is opaque. Previous studies have documented the political shift towards 
economic liberalism and the relevant support for the autonomy of the market in solving 
environmental problems. Main theoretical perspectives in this literature include the 
conceptualization of environmental self-regulation as decentralized institutions strategically 
used by firms for own benefit (King et al., 2005); institutional and resource-based views to 
analyze firms’ motives for adopting self-regulation (Darnall et al., 2008; Heras-Saizarbitoria 
et al., 2011); institutional perspectives discussing firms’ commitment (Boiral, 2007; Daddi et 
al., 2016; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Phan and Baird 2015); and insights from club 
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theory to discuss how governments can promote adoption of environmental self-regulation 
(Kolln and Prakash, 2002; Prakash and Potoski, 2007). Additionally, various studies have 
looked into the corporate and environmental benefits of environmental self-regulation (Ferrón-
Vílchez, 2016; Nishitani et al., 2012) and the potential of self-regulation in absence of state 
regulation (King and Toffel, 2009; Shimshack and Ward, 2005).  
Overall, there is skepticism in the literature about environmental self-regulation’s 
potential to substitute state regulation, as meta-analyses suggest that adopters of self-regulation 
perform no better than non-adopters (Lyon and Maxwell, 2007; Darnall and Sides, 2008). It is 
argued that environmental self-regulatory initiatives are not merely for harmless window-
dressing but they can significantly undermine the effectiveness of environmental state laws 
(Short and Toffel, 2010). In this context, the institutional economics literature has highlighted 
the importance of state regulation in the context of environmentally responsible businesses 
(Bartley, 2011). The main argument here is that since environmental self-regulation does not 
fully allow the market to control the negative externalities of economic activities, it fails to 
maximize society’s welfare and corrective policy interventions may be deemed necessary 
(Bowen et al., 2012).  
Yet, the political theory literature on transnational governance argues that state 
regulation alone is not effective in correcting market failures, because in a neoliberal and 
globalized economy, the state retreats from issues pertinent to corporate responsibility 
(Bauman, 2007). The argument is that globalization of the economy has downgraded the role 
of the state as political sovereignty. The state is expected to free capital and corporations from 
regulation and allow them to operate unfettered (Stiglitz, 2003). Some authors have gone as far 
as arguing that state no longer functions and that it is thoroughly appropriated by transnational 
corporations (Miyoshi, 1996). Others argue that the role of governments has been limited to 
establishing a minimum legal framework to ensure the operation of the market (De La Cuesta 
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Gonzalez and Martinez, 2004). Governments, including many European ones, have favored 
this position since it enabled them to minimize the financial and political risks state regulation 
entails (Vogel, 2005). In many cases, governments have declared their incapacity in dealing 
with social and environmental issues and have encouraged the adoption of self-regulatory 
approaches by providing regulatory relief such as granting permits, reductions in financial 
guarantees and tax reductions (Testa et al., 2016). According to Eberlein et al. (2014) such 
incapacity to fully regulate entails cooperation between public and private governance actors. 
Similarly, Abbott and Snidal (2009) emphasize the necessity of public and private governance 
actors to collaborate in order to pursue effective common-interest regulation, as governance 
actors need to have certain competencies (i.e. independence, representativeness, expertise and 
operational capacity) and no single governance actor, either private or public, has all the 
competencies.  
These accounts provide a rich framework for analysis but reveal little about the 
relationship between state environmental regulation and self-regulation. Most studies treat state 
regulation as uni-dimensional and focus mostly on externally certified forms of self-regulation 
ignoring non-certified in-house tools of self-regulation. To move beyond these tensions in the 
literature, we take a more detailed approach into regulation and self-regulation. Specifically, 
we focus on the policy instruments governments use to regulate environmental issues and the 
stringency of these tools.  We also take into account both types of adoption of self-regulation, 
namely in-house and externally certified. The discussion in the next section is organized to 
reflect the potentially different impact of state regulations upon self-regulatory tools of 
corporate environmental responsibility. 
 
2.2. State Environmental regulation: Direct instruments, Indirect instruments and Regulatory 
Stringency 
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The literature divides state environmental regulation tools into two categories: direct 
instruments (i.e. environmental regulations) and indirect instruments (i.e. environmental taxes) 
(Jiménez, 2005; OECD, 2010). Direct regulation is also referred as command-and-control, 
where command denotes the specification of direct and mandatory performance standards or 
technologies to abide by, and control indicates that non-compliance is penalized (Baumol, 
1988). Direct regulation policies utilize instruments such as ambient, technology-based and 
performance-based standards. Indirect instruments include Pigouvian taxes, subsidies, 
deposit/refund systems and tradable permits. They provide economic incentives to polluters in 
order to make the best private choice to coincide with the best social low-carbon choice 
(Milliman and Prince, 1989). 
Here we also consider the regulatory stringency defined as “the explicit and implicit, 
policy-induced price of environmental externalities” (OECD, 2015: 22). Regulatory stringency 
might be more important than the choice of a single direct or indirect instrument in controlling 
environmental impact (Frondel et al., 2007; Johnstone, 2007; Khanna et al., 2009), as it can 
enable cleaner alternatives to become more attractive than incumbent technologies or methods 
(Grubb et al., 2014). 
 
2.2.1 The Impact of Direct instruments upon In-house EMS and Externally Certified EMS 
Previous studies analyzing the influence of direct instruments on firms’ adoption of 
environmental self-regulatory tools point out that firms use these tools to avoid sanctions 
(Hackett, 2013). Most scholars see direct regulation as an enabler for the formation of corporate 
environmental governance regimes and, therefore, a driver for environmental self-regulation 
(Anton et al., 2004).  
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Institutional theory, the main theoretical framework adopted to investigate the role of 
environmental regulations in EMS diffusion, does not fully uncover regulatory complexity. 
Only a minority of studies recognizes the complex nature of environmental regulation and its 
multidimensional – and sometimes contradictory – effects on the uptake of environmental self-
regulation (Lynch-Wood and Williamson, 2011). Furthermore, past research does not always 
pay attention to important differences between certified and in-house forms of environmental 
self-regulation; the two types are bundled under a single category to represent environmental 
self-regulation, overlooking the fact that motivations to adopt in-house and externally certified 
EMS can be inherently different.  
The EMS literature argues that firms choosing to adopt any form of EMS are mainly 
interested in reducing their production costs and improving operational efficiency as an 
adoption motivation (Darnall et al., 2008; King and Lenox, 2001; Baek, 2017), whereas 
certifying these self-regulatory tools might be driven by the legitimacy5 (Husted et al., 2017) 
and signaling benefits of certification (Kwon et al., 2002; Castka and Prajogo, 2013). 
Furthermore, treating the in-house and certified forms of environmental self-regulation under 
one category overlooks the sequential relationship that exists between the two. Particularly for 
EMS, the decision to adopt an in-house EMS precedes the certification decision (Jiang and 
Bansal, 2003). 
Given that in-house adoption of EMS generates efficiency gains and delivers 
environmental benefits through waste reduction (Baek, 2017; Darnall et al., 2008), it can be 
particularly effective in creating corporate environmental improvements and meeting 
                                            
5 Recent work by Husted et al., (2017) highlights that MNE subsidiaries and domestic firms are augmenting their 
local legitimacy by adopting different types of certifications; as the first are seeking to overcome the liability of 
foreignness whilst the latter the liability of localness.  
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regulatory demands (Anton et al., 2004; Khanna et al., 2009; Testa et al., 2016; Wätzold et al., 
2001). Thus, in-house EMS adoption has the benefit of improving corporate performance and 
of signaling to the regulators that a firm is en route to better environmental performance. Hence, 
we would expect that regulatory compliance motivations arising from direct instruments might 
drive in-house EMS adoption.  
 In contrast, we would expect that direct instruments would have a negative effect on 
externally certified EMS as a number of recent studies (Berliner and Prakash, 2013; Prakash 
and Potoski, 2013) suggest that corporate voluntarism has evolved as a substitute for 
government intervention in the broader framework of neoliberal state policies. Accordingly, 
firms certify an in-house EMS externally in order to address the void created by the 
insufficiency of regulations and to signal their green credentials to stakeholders. Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho (2011) argue that the relationship between regulatory pressures and 
certification of environmental self-regulation is highly contextual and depends on how 
certification mechanisms interact with institutional regulations. If EMS certification has co-
evolved with regulatory forces and firms receive significant regulatory relief for certifying their 
EMS, then such certification would offer additional benefits for firms that already have an in-
house EMS. Only in such cases can direct regulations be expected to complement and boost 
certification decisions among firms that have adopted in-house EMS (Bansal and Bogner, 
2002). 
In heavily regulated environments, such as the UK, external certification of self-
regulation brings little regulatory relief to certifying companies, and result in rather low 
marginal benefits from certification (Glachant et al., 2002; Wätzold et al., 2001). As 
certification costs are high (Curkovic and Sroufe, 2011; Darnall and Edwards, 2006) and the 
marginal legitimacy benefits might be negligible, one could expect the prevalence of 
regulations to deter certification, particularly when firms face significant and urgent 
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compliance pressures and certification has little added value to offer on top of in-house 
adoption of environmental self-regulation. In such cases firms may instead opt for alternative 
actions that more effectively serve their compliance needs. 
 
2.2.2 The Impact of Indirect instruments upon In-house EMS and Externally Certified EMS 
The environmental economics literature argues that indirect (i.e. market-based) instruments are 
more flexible than direct regulations (Baumol, 1988) by providing significant opportunities for 
environmental corporate actions with a wider range of choices for the firm (Andersen and 
Sprenger, 2000). However, the empirical literature presents mixed findings that do not always 
confirm these theoretical propositions (Arimura et al. 2011; Frondel et al. 2008). Reviewing 
the econometric and case-study-based literature, Kemp and Pontoglio (2011) conclude that the 
impact of indirect instruments on self-regulatory tools of corporate environmental 
responsibility is significantly weaker than is asserted by theoretical environmental economists. 
Other empirical studies support this conclusion (Demirel and Kesidou, 2011; Testa et al., 
2012).  
In sum, whilst the theoretical literature postulates that indirect instruments stimulate 
environmentally responsible practices, empirical research does not necessarily endorse that 
view. This inconsistency may be due to the fact that indirect instruments are applied more laxly 
than direct regulation instruments (Frondel et al., 2007). Based on these contrasting arguments, 
we tentatively expect that indirect instruments, such as environmental taxes, could drive the 
adoption of in-house EMS provided that they are set at an adequate rate. Setting taxes at an 
appropriate rate is critical, as the tax rate needs to reflect not only the externality costs imposed 
on the global climate, but also the environmental opportunities that taxes may engender (e.g. 
adoption of EMS or investment in clean technologies) (Grubb et al., 2014).  
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Yet, when it comes to certified forms of self-regulation, one would expect that indirect 
instruments would have a negative effect on externally certified EMS due to high certification 
costs and marginal legitimacy benefits as discussed in Section 2.2.1 (Curkovic and Sroufe, 
2011).  
 
2.2.3 The Impact of Regulatory Stringency upon In-house EMS and Externally Certified EMS 
The motivation to adopt self-regulatory tools such as EMS in order to comply with 
environmental regulations is stronger in circumstances where firms are confronted with more 
stringent regulatory requirements and a higher threat of potential sanctions. Evidence from 
advanced and emerging economies (Angel and Rock, 2005; Darnall et al, 2008) shows that 
under more stringent policy schemes, self-regulation can offer higher value to a firm by 
controlling its environmental impact and reducing the sanction’s risk associated with non-
compliance. Thus, we would expect that firms faced with regulatory stringency would be more 
likely to adopt in-house EMS.  
Earlier studies state that the same applies for external certification; as in stringently 
regulated and monitored environments certification sends a credible signal of cleanness to the 
government (Johnstone and Labonne, 2009). However, recent studies argue that there may be 
little need to signal cleanness through formal certification under heavily regulated industrial 
settings where pollution levels are already closely measured, monitored, and controlled by the 
authorities. Berliner and Prakash (2013) and Prakash and Potoski (2013) state that EMS 
certification is used to generate a distinction via brand name recognition, which assures 
stakeholders that the firm is clean. When regulatory regimes are lax, firms tend to certify their 
EMS in order to differentiate themselves in the marketplace. Yet, the potential marginal 
benefits of certification decline with increased regulatory pressures and more stringent 
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monitoring (Prakash and Potoski, 2012). Hence, we would expect that regulatory stringency 
would have a negative effect on externally certified EMS.  
Overall, whilst the impact of direct and indirect instruments and regulatory stringency 
upon in-house EMS adoption is generally found to be positive; the literature is less clear about 
the effects of state environmental regulations upon external certification. The empirical section 
of this article aims to advance this literature and to deliver evidence of how regulations interact 
with self-regulatory tools by focusing on the case of EMS in the UK.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1. Sample 
The empirical research in this article is based on a dataset of companies that participated in the 
UK’s Environmental Protection Expenditure by Industry for the manufacturing, mining and 
quarrying sectors (for information on the dataset see: Demirel and Kesidou, 2011; Kesidou and 
Demirel, 2012; Kneller and Manderson, 2012). It contains information about the financial and 
environmental protection activities of plants, including a question that asks companies which 
EMS they have implemented with possible responses of: (1) None, (2) In-house, (3) ISO14001, 
and (4) EMAS. The survey questions are reported in Appendix A. The survey is administered 
by the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and uses a stratified 
random sample of companies with a minimum of ten employees (based on the Standard 
Industrial Classification and firm size) across industrial sectors with different levels of 
pollution potential (see industrial sector profile of participants in Appendix B). The data 
collected in this survey constitutes the basis for the UK’s official environmental statistics and 
provides the broadest coverage and detail among environmental surveys conducted in the UK.  
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The article draws on data published in 2013 and includes firms with positive 
environmental spending.6 Of the 7,827 facilities contacted, 2,352 returned validated responses, 
giving a response rate of 30%. This is in line with similar surveys in the field (see Darnall et 
al., 2010). Further cleaning of the data to eliminate responses with missing observations 
resulted in a total of 2,076 firms included in the current analysis.  
 
3.2. Empirical Strategy and Dependent Variables  
Previous studies model the adoption of in-house EMS and external certification of EMS, either 
separately treating these two decisions as independent with no synergies, or acknowledge the 
related nature of the two decisions but do not view them as sequential (e.g. Johnstone and 
Labonne, 2009; Ziegler and Nogareda, 2009).  However, there are significant overlaps between 
the requirements of in-house EMS and externally certified EMS, invalidating the theoretical 
basis for the perception of two decisions as independent. In practice, the decision to certify 
EMS is an extra step after in-house EMS adoption (Jiang and Bansal, 2003).7 In first instance, 
an in-house EMS is put in place. Subsequently, a pilot period follows during which gaps 
between the implemented EMS and the EMS’s requirements are identified and addressed 
through appropriate improvements. Only, after this stage, a firm may opt for an external audit 
to acquire external certification or an internal audit to maintain the in-house EMS (Terlaak, 
2007).  
                                            
6 In the two years after that, DEFRA collected information only from heavily polluting firms. As a result, the 
sample was significantly smaller (227 companies in 2014 and 200 companies in 2015) and not adequate for 
statistical analysis as it is not representative of the population of companies in the UK. It should be noted that the 
analysis in this article reflects the EMS in-house adoption and certification among firms with positive 
environmental spending. 
7 Organizations seeking to adopt an in-house EMS often use external consultants who analyse the firm’s operations 
and environmental impacts. An EMS is then designed and implemented in line with the requirements of the 
standard (usually ISO14001 or EMAS). This begins with documenting how the organization interfaces with the 
environment, followed by establishing environmental objectives, targets and a programme to accomplish them 
(Iatridis and Kesidou, 2016). 
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Figure 2 depicts the nested structure of in-house and external certification decisions. 
The first decision that a firm takes is whether to adopt an in-house EMS. Afterwards, following 
a piloting period, it has to decide whether to certify the EMS externally. In other words, firms 
that certify their EMS are often a subsample of those that adopted an in-house EMS. Unless 
this sequential structure is incorporated into the empirical estimation strategy, the estimates are 
biased and inconsistent due to sample selection problems (Heckman, 1977). Hence, the 
adoption and certification of an EMS need to be jointly modeled, as the two decisions cannot 
be treated as independently exogenous.   
--------------------- FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ----------------------------------- 
 
To account for the aforementioned sample selection problem, we use a bivariate probit 
with sample selection model, where a selection equation is estimated using the full sample, 
followed by an outcome equation estimated for the selected observations. Differently from the 
Heckman selection model, the dependent variables in both the selection and outcome equations 
are binary variables (Greene, 2012).8 We jointly model the two dichotomous dependent 
variables in-house EMS adoption (EMS) and external certification EMS (CERT_EMS) in a 
two-stage econometric model with a nested structure:  
(Eq.1) 
STAGE 1: 𝑺𝑬𝑳𝑬𝑪𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵 𝑬𝑸𝑼𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵 with dependent variable EMS 
𝑦𝑖2 = 𝛽2𝑥𝑖2 + 𝜀𝑖2, 𝑦𝑖2 = 1    𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖2
∗ > 0 , 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
 
STAGE 2: 𝑶𝑼𝑻𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬 𝑬𝑸𝑼𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵 with dependent variable CERT_EMS 
𝑦𝑖1 = 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + 𝜀𝑖1, 𝑦𝑖1 = 1      𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖1
∗ > 0 , 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
  
(𝑦𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖,1) 𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦𝑖2 = 1 
                                            
8 Stata’s heckprob command is used for the estimations. 
17 
 
 
The dichotomous dependent variables of the selection and outcome equations are 
derived from the EMS-related questions in the survey. Firms were asked whether they had 
implemented an environmental management system (EMS) and whether this was certified 
(CERT_EMS) by ISO14001 or EMAS. Both are binary variables taking the value of 1 in the 
case of a positive response to the relevant question (see Appendix A). 35.2% of firms have an 
in-house EMS and of these 51% are externally certified.9 
 
3.3. Independent Variables 
To investigate the impact of direct instruments, we use the variable environmental regulations 
(ENV_REG), which takes the value 1 if a firm indicates that its decision to invest in 
environmental protection was affected by the presence of environmental regulations at national 
level. We examine the impact of indirect instruments with the use of the ENV_TAX variable 
that takes the value 1 if the firm reveals that environmental taxes have been a reason for its 
investments in environmental protection.  
In order to examine the impact of the stringency of government’s overall environmental 
policy interventions across direct and indirect instruments, we use the variable STRING which 
is constructed as the proportion of abatement costs incurred (i.e. the capital and operating costs 
of complying with all types of environmental regulations) relative to the firm’s annual turnover. 
Pollution abatement costs are used as a measure of environmental stringency in the literature 
reflecting that firms in more energy intensive sectors/businesses face higher pollution 
                                            
9 The majority of the firms with certification have opted for ISO14001 certification. In particular, 17% of all 
responding companies had an EMS certified to ISO14001, and 0.34% certified to EMAS. 
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abatement expenditures and are more likely to be affected by regulatory stringency 
(Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003).10  
We complement the DEFRA survey with data from external sources to account for 
energy use by industry, an alternative proxy for regulatory stringency. Prior research has shown 
that energy use intensity is closely correlated with pollution emissions (Cole et al., 2005) and 
regulatory stringency experienced at the industry level (Gary and Shimshack, 2011). Thus, we 
investigate the differences across industries facing different degrees of regulatory stringency. 
In order to capture the tendencies of in-house EMS adoption and certification in more/less 
polluting industries, we group the industries represented in our data under five quintiles 
(ENERGY_Q1-Q5) based on their annual energy use as detailed in Appendix B.  
 
3.4. Control Variables 
We control for a range of factors that are considered important EMS drivers. First, we control 
for the impact of customer pressures (Arimura et al., 2011) by using a dummy variable CUST; 
indicating whether the firm has invested in environmental protection due to customer demands. 
Second, we control for heterogeneity in the innovative capabilities of firms as a driver of EMS 
adoption and certification (Cañón-de-Francia et al., 2007). Accordingly, we use two firm-level 
indicators of technological innovation capabilities: ECORD and EQUIP. ECORD captures 
firms’ innovation capabilities by taking the logarithm of R&D budget specifically allocated for 
environmental innovations. EQUIP is a dummy variable reflecting whether the company has 
invested in machine and equipment upgrades to offset its environmental impact. Third, we use 
the logarithm of cost savings (CS) to control for claims that cost cutting benefits’ of 
                                            
10 King and Lenox (2001) recommend adjusting similar measures of stringency geographically to account for the 
differences varied environmental regulation across different regions. It was not possible to make this adjustment 
in the dataset due to anonymity of the firms, and the relatively central nature of environmental regulations in the 
UK. 
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environmental corporate behavior is an important driver of EMS adoption (Porter and van der 
Linde, 1995). Fourth, we control for company effects (PARENT) to address the arguments 
that parent company pressures in the form of authoritative directives lead to EMS adoption 
(Annandale et al., 2004), whereas the decision to certify EMS is often left to local facilities 
(Jiang and Bansal, 2003). Finally, in all estimations, we control for firm size with the logarithm 
of the number of employees (SIZE) (Martin-Peña et al., 2014).  
To identify the selection equation, we use two variables: PROD, the ratio of company 
turnover to employment, as a proxy for firm productivity, and INH, the ratio of in-house 
environmental protection expenditures to total environmental operating costs, as a proxy for 
in-house capabilities in environmental protection (Lannelongue and González-Benito, 2012). 
Firm productivity and in-house environmental capabilities are likely to drive the adoption of 
in-house EMS. For example, Darnall and Edwards (2006) find evidence that superior firm 
capabilities reduce the overall costs of EMS adoption and therefore, encourage adoption. Once 
EMS are implemented within a firm, we would expect that the decision to certify them not to 
be contingent upon in-house capabilities. This is mainly due to the fact that external 
stakeholders drive the certification decision, which is used to gain legitimacy (Jiang and 
Bansal, 2003; Neumayer and Perkins, 2004).  
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables used 
and offers a summary profiling of the participants while full survey questions are reported in 
Appendix A. Additionally, we checked for Common Method Variance and reached the 
conclusion that this is not a major concern in the current work.11 
                                            
11 To check for Common Method Variance (CMV), we took into account a number of ex ante approaches, 
implemented in the research design, as well as an ex post approach, implemented after the research was conducted. 
Four key sources of CMV are identified in the literature: (a) common rater effect, (b) item characteristics effect, 
(c) item context effect, and (d) measurement context effect (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In the current study, even 
though variables derive from simple and unambiguous constructs, it is still crucial to assess whether any sources 
of CMV are present in the data. (a) Common rater effect arises when respondents modify their answers due to 
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---------------TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ------------------------------------ 
 
4. Results 
Table 2 presents the estimation results. Firstly, we note that the empirical strategy employed in 
the article to control for sample selection is superior to a simple probit model as confirmed by 
the significant rho statistics for all models (M1-M3). The estimations presented in Table 2 are 
for a base (M1), a full (M2), and an alternative model (M3).  
With regards to environmental regulation, the results show that the coefficients 
indicating the impact of ENV_REG on in-house EMS adoption are positive and statistically 
significant (p < 0.001) in M1-M3, while the coefficients indicating the impact of ENV_REG 
on EMS certification are negative in M1-M3 with significance levels ranging between 
statistically significant (p < 0.05) to marginally significant (p<0.10).  
With reference to environmental taxes, the findings in M1-M3 suggest that the variable 
ENV_TAX exerts a positive impact upon in-house EMS adoption and a negative impact upon 
EMS certification, even though none of these effects is statistically significant (p>0.10).  
As for regulatory stringency, the results indicate that the STRING variable in M1-M3 
exerts a positive effect on the adoption of in-house EMS, while it affects the certification 
                                            
reasons of social desirability (Malhotra et al., 2006). To minimize social desirability bias, all questionnaires were 
anonymous. (b) Item characteristics effect occurs when the questions are obscurely phrased. Such bias was not a 
problem in the current study due to simple and concise definitions. (c) Item context effect is a problem when 
numerous questions lead to respondent fatigue, or when the placing of the questions linked to the dependent and 
independent variables may suggest a causal relationship. Questions associated to the dependent and independent 
variables were presented in a balanced manner in the questionnaire to avoid this. (d) Measurement context effect 
is a problem when a single respondent provides answers to the independent and dependent variables at the same 
time (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Malhotra et al., 2006). Measurement context effects may be present in the data as 
the independent and dependent variables were measured simultaneously from one source. As an ex-post approach, 
we used Harman’s (1967) single-factor test with an unrotated factor analysis applied to all variables. If CMV is 
present in the data, a single factor accounts for the majority of the variance in the variables (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). The unrotated factor analysis produced four factors accounting for 47% of the cumulative variance – so no 
single factor emerged suggesting that CMV does not significantly affect the results of the empirical analysis. 
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decision negatively even though the majority of these coefficients are marginally significant or 
insignificant. Further evidence on the positive effects of regulatory stringency on in-house 
EMS adoption and the negative effects for EMS certification is found in M3. The coefficients 
for industries associated with different energy-use-intensity (ENERGY_Q1-Q5) suggest that 
firms in the most polluting industries (ENERGY_Q5) are more likely to adopt an in-house 
EMS, whereas firms in less polluting industries have a higher tendency to certify 
(ENERGY_Q2). Industries with lower energy-use/environmental-impact are characterized by 
environmental impact opacity, referring to the obscurity of a firm’s environmental impact and 
the difficulty for external stakeholders to assess it, as these industries feature laxer regulations 
and less clear emission criteria (Jiang and Bansal, 2003). In absence of clear regulatory criteria, 
externally certified forms of EMS can fill the void and help firms gain legitimacy and transmit 
information to external stakeholders. Closely monitored energy-intensive industries, on the 
other hand, present reduced environmental impact opacity. Hence, EMS certification presents 
a lower ability to function as a distinguishing branding strategy (Neumayer and Perkins, 2004).  
--------------------------- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE -------------------------------- 
 
Regarding control variables, as represented in M2, the CUST variable has a positive but 
insignificant impact in the selection and outcome equations. Hence, customers’ environmental 
concerns do not appear to influence the EMS in-house adoption and certification decisions. 
Prior studies report that customers’ environmental concerns do not often translate into purchase 
actions (Lane and Potter, 2007; Young et al., 2010). 
Proxies for firms’ technological innovation capabilities, ECORD and EQUIP, suggest 
that innovation capabilities among firms are a significant driver of EMS in-house adoption but 
have no significant impact upon certification. The finding that EMS in-house adoption builds 
on the technological innovation capabilities of a firm is in line with studies pointing to 
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complementarities between technological and organizational innovations (Battisti and 
Stoneman, 2010), and between technological and environmental innovations (Demirel and 
Kesidou, 2011; Ziegler and Nogareda, 2009). Yet, the lack of a significant relationship between 
innovation capabilities and EMS certification suggests that the latter has less to do with a firm’s 
capabilities and is more a reflection of its strategic objectives. 
The cost savings variable (CS) displays a significant impact in the case of in-house 
adoption, with no significant impact upon certification. While the former is in line with the 
EMS literature, which asserts that firms adopt EMS to reduce waste and save costs by 
improving environmental organizational capabilities (Darnall et al., 2008), the latter is not out 
of line with the mixed results on the relationship between cost savings and EMS certification 
(Arimura et al., 2011; Johnstone and Labonne, 2009). Critics of EMS certification argue that it 
is usually used as an image-building tool, which might not improve environmental performance 
or save costs for most cases (Aravind and Christmann, 2011; de Jong et al., 2014).  
Our findings indicate that parental pressures (PARENT) have a positive impact on the 
adoption of EMS while negatively affecting certification. This could relate to the attempts firms 
make to centralize their EMS certification to headquarters/main-sites so that the costs of 
certification can be limited. Finally, in relation to firm size (SIZE), in line with the findings of 
the literature, larger firms are found more likely to adopt and certify EMS. This can be 
attributed to the bigger environmental budgets large firms have and the higher societal 
pressures they face due to their higher visibility (Hillary, 2004).  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions  
Previous studies examining the relationship between self-regulatory tools and state 
environmental regulation treat the latter as an important, yet one-dimensional factor. However, 
state regulation encompasses diverse types of environmental policies, affecting self-regulation 
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and, in turn, environmental corporate responsibility in different ways. Furthermore, there is a 
paucity of studies that examine the in-house adoption and certification decisions of self-
regulation simultaneously. Prior literature focuses on single self-regulatory tools while 
overlooking the interrelationship between in-house adoption and external certification of self-
regulation (Heras-Saizarbitoria et al., 2011; Singh et al., 2015). 
In this article, we address the aforementioned gaps by framing a firm’s decision to 
certify its EMS as a subsequent decision to in-house EMS adoption. Conceptually, we clarify 
the decision-making sequence, whereby self-regulatory tools are first implemented and then 
certified. Empirically, we show that a firm’s decision to seek certification is endogenously 
determined. Consequently, by accounting for the nested nature of the two decisions, we are 
able to provide less biased and more consistent insights into the determinants of self-regulation.  
The findings of this research advance knowledge in the corporate environmental 
responsibility literature by focusing on different dimensions of a regulatory regime and 
analyzing how different types of regulatory instruments affect firms’ decisions to adopt and 
certify environmental self-regulation. We shift the focus towards different types of regulation 
to uncover the true influence of state regulation on voluntary self-regulation. Furthermore, the 
focus of this research, on in-house adoption and external certification decisions, refines 
knowledge of the relationship between state environmental regulation and self-regulation. 
Previous studies (Potoski and Prakash, 2013) have conceptualized these two forms of 
regulation as adversaries by proposing that in heavily regulated environments there is no need 
for firms to adopt self-regulatory tools such as EMS. We contribute to this stream of literature 
by showing that in heavily regulated environments, regulation partly substitutes for the external 
certification element of such tools, but not their in-house adoption.  
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More precisely, the results of this study illustrate that the requirements to comply with 
direct environmental regulations encourage the adoption of EMS as a means to reduce firms’ 
environmental impact, but detract from EMS certification. Hence, environmental regulation 
complements the in-house adoption of self-regulatory tools and substitutes for the certification 
element of these tools. Given that firms adopting in-house forms of EMS are mainly interested 
in improving their efficiency (Darnall et al, 2008), our findings support the view that 
collaboration between state regulation and self-regulation can ensure effective environmental 
protection (Eberlein et al., 2014; Abbott and Snidal, 2009). Also, our findings on certification 
align with the literature suggesting that certification is a solution to problems of information 
asymmetries, separating the good apples from the bad (Akerlof, 1970; Bartley, 2011; Potoski 
and Prakash, 2009). More research in this area is needed, as the recent trend of deregulation 
worldwide might be the reason for the rise of certifications issued. Yet, we argue, in order to 
ensure effective environmental regulation, we need collaboration between various governance 
actors, not the substitution of one governance actor for another.  
Our results related to indirect regulatory instruments do not provide robust evidence for 
the influence of environmental taxes on the in-house or certified adoption of EMS. This is 
surprising in light of the environmental economics literature, which promotes environmental 
taxes over direct regulation as more flexible and effective option (Martin et al., 2014). Whilst 
environmental taxes are prominently promoted due to flexibility, their implications for self-
regulation are rarely discussed in the literature. A plausible explanation for these findings might 
be that environmental taxes are applied more laxly compared to direct instruments as 
governments come under pressure by industry lobbies (Milne and Andersen, 2012). The 
findings of this work highlight the need for further research in this area. 
With regards to the influence of regulatory stringency on the in-house adoption and 
certification of EMS, the results broadly support the Porter Hypothesis (Porter and van der 
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Linde, 1995), suggesting that strict environmental regulation induces corporate 
environmentalism. In particular, industry-based regulatory stringency appears to play an 
important role in the adoption of in-house EMS. Thus, despite global economic trends of 
shifting regulatory control from public to the private domain, public regulation seems crucial 
for engaging firms in environmental actions. Remarkably, our findings indicate that the 
opposite happens with certification; the intensity of regulatory pressure reduces the likelihood 
of certification. This result seems paradoxical in the context of rising certification trends in the 
UK over the past few years (ISO, 2014). Yet, under widespread EU and UK neoliberal 
economic policies that diminish the power of public regulation, this trend illustrates that, under 
weaker regulatory pressures, certification grows in response to state’s retreat.  
In addition to theoretical contributions, the results of this research have implications for 
policymakers and practitioners. It is demonstrated that environmental regulation has a 
significant role to play in promoting corporate responsibility through self-regulation.  
Collaboration between policymakers and managers could potentially generate high returns for 
both actors, in that it could result in effective environmental regulations that correct market 
failures, thus reducing pollution and safeguarding firms’ legitimacy. Policymakers should not 
be reluctant to regulate – and, when doing so, they should promote the adoption of self-
regulatory tools like ISO14001 by providing regulatory relief for certified firms.  
The article has a number of limitations. First, whilst this work disentangles the 
implications of regulatory dimensions to a significant extent, regulations consist of highly 
complex policy mixes operating with different instruments at national, regional, and local 
levels. The data used in this study focuses on the presence of different types of environmental 
policy instruments (i.e. direct and indirect) and their overall stringency, but it does not cover 
all dimensions or specific instruments (e.g. technology and performance standards, emission 
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or product taxes). Future research that focuses on the implications of specific instruments for 
voluntary environmental programmes could provide important extensions to this work.  
Second, the measurements used to capture the quality of EMS in this study rely on 
binary responses, whereas more detailed information on the maturity and completeness of in-
house EMS applications (Darnall and Kim, 2012; Inoue et al., 2013) would allow further 
research to reveal the relationship between state regulation and self-regulation more precisely. 
Additionally, confirming the presence of in-house EMS on company websites and through brief 
consultations with participants, as well as crosschecking external EMS certifications using 
registers of certification bodies, could improve the validity of the data. 
Third, as our analysis is based on a cross-sectional dataset, endogeneity problems are 
difficult to detect and control for. For example, ECORD could be potentially endogenous (i.e. 
firm specific unobservables that are correlated with ECORD might also determine EMS 
adoption and certification). As constructing a panel is not currently an option with this dataset, 
we are limited to dealing with this issue in a cross-sectional space. In doing so, we have re-run 
our regressions in absence of such control variables that could be endogenous. The results 
reveal that the impact of the main policy instrument variables remain unchanged, instilling 
confidence that any potential endogeneity issues are minor. Although we correct for 
endogeneity arising from selection bias and control for a large number of factors that affect 
EMS-related decisions in an attempt to minimize omitted variable bias, future work that uses 
panel data could offer a platform more conducive to tackling these econometric issues. The 
same applies to the fourth limitation of this article. The dataset used did not allow us to capture 
the tendency of firms that have adopted EMS and are preparing to get certified. Here too, the 
use of panel data will allow future studies to overcome such issues.  
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Finally, we acknowledge the limitations of the model resulting from the limited 
coverage of the dataset. Broader samples that cover the services sector can provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of EMS adoption and certification as an increasing number of 
service firms engage with EMS (Molina-Azorin et al., 2015). Additionally, as close links are 
present between environmental management and firms’ innovative capabilities; indicators of 
innovation can help to improve the predicting capacity of the models (Martín-Peña et al., 2014). 
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Appendix A. Summary of Survey Questions of All Variables. 
Symbol Variables Survey questions 
Dependent variables  
EMS 
=1 if the firm has internally implemented 
environmental management systems (In-
House). 
 
(1) Which of the following Environmental Management 
Systems have you implemented?(a) ISO14001; (b) 
EMAS; (c) In-House; (d) None; (e) Don’t know 
CERT_EMS 
=1 if the firm has externally certified 
environmental management system 
(ISO14001 and/or EMAS). 
Independent variables  
ENV_REG 
=1 if the firm invested in environmental 
protection due to environmental 
regulation compliance. 
(2) Please give one reason for your environmental 
capital expenditure: (a) Environmental regulation 
compliance; (b) Equipment upgrade; (c) Environmental 
taxes e.g. climate change levy; (d) Customer 
environmental requirement; (e) Parent company or 
owner policy/corporate social responsibility policy; (f) 
Other.  
ENV_TAX 
=1 if the firm invested in environmental 
protection because of environmental 
taxes. 
STRING 
Stringency of environmental regulations 
= Abatement costs (i.e. capital and 
operating environmental protection 
expenditure) (£) /Annual turnover (£). 
(3) What was your company’s total capital expenditure 
on ‘end-of-pipe’ pollution control equipment and 
‘integrated’ processes that became operational in 2010? 
(4) What were your company’s total environmental 
operating costs in 2010? 
(5) Turnover in 2010 for the unit reported on in this 
questionnaire. 
Note: Abatement costs is calculated as (3)+(4) 
Control variables  
CUST =1 if the firm invested in environmental 
protection because of customer 
environmental requirements. 
Survey question 2d as above. 
ECORD Logarithm of Environmental Research 
and Development expenditure 
How much was spent during 2010 on Research and 
Development to reduce the environmental impacts of 
your company’s activities?  
EQUIP =1 if the firm invested in environmental 
protection because of equipment 
upgrade. 
Survey question 2b as above.  
CS Logarithm of Total cost savings resulting 
from environmental improvements (£). 
(6) Total annual savings against business as usual, 
resulting from: (a) improved use of or substitution of war 
materials; (b) more efficient water use or reductions in 
effluent; (c) more efficient energy use; (d) savings in 
waste disposal costs; (e) other.  
PARENT =1 if the firm invested in environmental 
protection because of parent company. 
Survey question 2e as above. 
SIZE 
Logarithm of number of employees. (7) Number of persons employed (at 31/12/2010) for the 
unit reported on in this questionnaire.  
PROD Productivity  
= Annual turnover (£) / Number of 
employees.  
Survey questions (5) and (7) as above.  
INH 
In-house capabilities in environmental 
protection 
= In-house environmental protection 
expenditures (£) / Total Environmental 
Operating Expenditures 
(8) What were your company’s total in-house 
environmental operating costs in 2010 for all 
environmental protection facilities and environmental 
management (including labour, leasing payments for 
equipment, chemicals etc.)? 
(9) What were your company’s total environmental 
operating costs in 2010?  
Note. DEFRA Government Survey of Environmental Protection Expenditure by Industry 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/environmental-protection-expenditure-survey). 
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Appendix B. Classification of Industries into Energy Quintiles. 
 ENERGY QUINTILES  
SIC Code (2007) 
(and % of firms in 
the sample)    
ENERGY_Q1 5 (0.17%) Mining of coal and lignite 
 (Lowest Polluting) 9 (1.02%) Mining support service activities 
  14 (1.28%) Manufacture of wearing apparel 
  15 (1.79%) Manufacture of leather and related products 
  26 (11.31%) Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 
  32 (2.59%) Other manufacturing 
  33 (2.85%) Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
ENERGY_Q2 8 (2.21%) Other mining and quarrying 
  16 (3.40%) 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
  18 (5.40%) Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
  27 (3.15%) Manufacture of electrical equipment 
  30 (1.40%) Manufacture of other transport equipment 
  31 (3.27%) Manufacture of furniture 
  36 (0.43%) 
Water collection, treatment and disposal activities, materials 
recovery 
ENERGY_Q3 11 (0.64%) Manufacture of beverages 
  13 (2.00%) Manufacture of textiles 
  21 (1.66%) 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations 
  25 (13.78%) 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
  28 (6.42%) Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
  29 (2.30%) Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
ENERGY_Q4 10 (5.70%) Manufacture of food products 
  17 (1.57%) Manufacture of paper and paper products 
  22 (6.29%) Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
  23 (2.42%) Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 
ENERGY_Q5 6 (0.38%) Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 
 (Highest Polluting) 19 (0.81%) Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 
  20 (12.80%) Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
  24 (1.62%) Manufacture of basic metals 
  35 (1.36%) Electricity, gas, steam and airconditioning supply 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics.  
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dependent Variables     
EMS 2076 0.352 0.478 0 1 
CERT_EMS 2076 0.178 0.383 0 1 
Independent Variables     
ENV_REG 2076 0.163 0.369 0 1 
ENV_TAX 2076 0.013 0.113 0 1 
STRING 2076 0.024 0.398 9.89x10-09 14.355 
Control Variables     
SIZE 2076 3.704 1.171 0 9.393 
CUST 2076 0.017 0.131 0 1 
PARENT 2076 0.045 0.208 0 1 
EQUIP 2076 0.072 0.259 0 1 
ECORD 2076 1.047 2.822 0 15.939 
CS 2076 1.582 3.452 0 16.030 
PROD 2076 144076.900 236897.800 22.143 4967625.000 
INH 2076 0.188 0.268 0 1 
Note: Full variable descriptions are available in Appendix A. 
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Table 2: Probit with Sample Selection Estimation Results.  
 M1 M2 M3 
 Adoption Certification Adoption Certification Adoption Certification 
 (Selection Eq.) (Outcome Eq.) (Selection Eq.) (Outcome Eq.) (Selection Eq.) (Outcome Eq.) 
Policy Instruments 
ENV_REG 0.158***  -0.072* 0.154***  -0.087** 0.154***  -0.069*  
(0.031) (0.044) (0.032) (0.039) (0.032) (0.038) 
ENV_TAX 0.083 -0.098 0.016 -0.090 0.017 -0.094 
 (0.100) (0.140) (0.100) (0.129) (0.099) (0.128) 
STRING 0.031 -0.379 0.034* -0.529 0.023  -0.814* 
 (0.023) (0.505) (0.020) (0.467) (0.017) (0.493) 
ENERGY_Q2     -0.019 0.096** 
 
    (0.034) (0.042) 
ENERGY_Q3     -0.007 -0.013 
 
    (0.031) (0.042) 
ENERGY_Q4     -0.054 -0.052 
 
    (0.035) (0.057) 
ENERGY_Q5     0.066* 0.048 
     (0.037) (0.044) 
Control Variables 
SIZE 0.098*** 0.117*** 0.075*** 0.096*** 0.068*** 0.083*** 
 (0.011) (0.038) (0.011) (0.034) (0.011) (0.027) 
CUST   0.050 0.088 0.048 0.093 
   (0.094) (0.095) (0.092) (0.093) 
ECORD   0.016*** 0.001 0.016*** -0.000 
   (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
EQUIP   0.183*** -0.073 0.186*** -0.058 
   (0.049) (0.053) (0.048) (0.050) 
CS   0.013*** -0.004 0.012*** -0.003 
 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
PARENT   0.171***  -0.160*** 0.146**  -0.180*** 
   (0.062) (0.065) (0.062) (0.064) 
INH 0.393***  0.281***  0.281***  
 (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.046)  
PROD 2.03x10-7***  2.12x10-7***  2x10-7***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
INDUSTRY DUMMIES  YES YES YES YES NO NO 
Number of Observations 2076  2076  2076  
Censored Observations 1346  1346  1346  
Log Pseudolikelihood -1553.294  -1511.510  -1572.544  
Wald Chi2 62.99***  77.2***  47.33***  
Athrho  -0.786***   -1.055***   -0.942***  
Rho -0.656  -0.784  -0.736  
Wald Test of Independent 
Equations (rho=0):  8.42**  10.17***  12.82***  
 
Notes. *significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level.  
-The dependent variable in adoption equations is EMS while the dependent variable in the certification 
equations is CERT_EMS. 
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-The reported coefficients are the marginal effects and the robust standard errors. Note that average discrete 
probability effects are reported for dummy variables. 
-Industry dummies at two-digit level are included. 
-The seemingly unrelated estimation tests: Model (1) chi2( 32) =   87.14 p=0.00, Model (2) chi2( 37) =  138.35, 
p=0.00, Model (3) chi2(  9) =  115.56, p =0.00. 
-Likelihood ratio test for identification variables being equal to zero: Model (1) LR chi2(2)= 105.90, p=0.00 
Model (2) LR chi2(2)  = 60.86, p= 0.00 Model (3) LR chi2(2)=64.29, p=0.00.   
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      Figure 1.  Conceptual Model   
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Figure 2. Nested Structure of In-house EMS Adoption and External Certification Decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
NO EMS 
(=1346 firms) 
EMS 
(=730 firms) 
CERTIFIED EMS 
(= 370 firms) 
NOT CERTIFIED 
EMS 
(=360 firms) 
DECISION 1 
(Selection Equation) 
Adoption of In-house EMS 
 
DECISION 2 
(Outcome Equation)  
External Certification of EMS 
 
FULL SAMPLE 
(=2076 firms) 
